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Acquisitions in the Lodging Industry
Good News for
Buyers and Sellers
In the last two decades of the twentieth century the lodg-ing industry experienced an unprecedented level of con-solidation. In particular, mergers and acquisitions among
lodging companies took place at record levels in the late 1990s.
From 1982 through 2000 the industry saw a total of 57 ac-
quisitions with an aggregate market value in the target com-
panies’ stocks of over $53 billion dollars. Exhibit 1 (overleaf )
reports the annual number and annual market value of target
stocks for all lodging acquisitions completed during that
1982–2000 period. The sample, supplied by Securities Data
Corporation (SDC), includes mergers of both public and pri-
vate companies in which at least one of the companies in-
volved operates in the lodging industry.1  A noticeable trend
1 Note that the sample used for Exhibit 1, supplied by Securities Data Cor-
poration, is larger than the sample used in this study because the size of the
data sample used in this study was limited by the need for daily stock-price
data.
in the data is that the value of lodging mergers increased dra-
matically since 1993. In 1993 the industry saw two mergers
valued at $29.7 million, while in 1998 a total of 11 mergers
were valued at $25 billion. That is, the value of acquisitions
in the lodging industry was almost 1,000 times greater in 1998
than in 1993.
The fervor of consolidation has been based on a belief that
gains can accrue to the merged entity through expense reduc-
tions, increased market power, reduced earnings volatility, and
economies of scale and scope. The critical question, then, is
whether lodging mergers actually achieve the expected per-
formance gains. If consolidation truly leads to performance
gains, then shareholder wealth can be increased. How-
ever, if consolidating merged entities is so difficult that the
expected gains do not accrue, then mergers may lead to a less-
profitable and less-valuable lodging industry.
Takeovers in the lodging industry generally have resulted in gains for both the acquired
and the acquirers—unlike many other industries.
BY LINDA CANINA
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EXHIBIT 1
Mergers result in overall benefits when the
consolidated entity is more valuable than the
aggregate of the two predecessors. Such an in-
crease in value may be achieved in any of several
ways. If the management of the acquiring insti-
tution is superior to that of the target firm, then
higher levels of performance may be attained
through improved management. Benefits may
also be achieved when a more-efficient institu-
tion is created through the elimination of redun-
dant facilities and personnel or through offer-
ing a more-profitable mix of products and ser-
vices. Finally, increased market power may raise
performance.
Despite theoretically favorable prospects,
merger gains may be difficult to achieve in prac-
tice. Consolidating two large, formerly indepen-
dent organizations into one firm can be a costly
and difficult process. The effort required to merge
may be so substantial that any benefits to con-
solidation may be lost. This problem is especially
severe if managers overestimate their ability to
manage newly acquired assets. Moreover, in light
of the large number of mergers that took place in
the industry, managers may be more willing to pur-
sue imprudent acquisitions just to keep pace with
competitors or to avoid being acquired themselves.
On average, fewer than half of mergers across
all industries have created value. The Economist,
for instance, offered the following dim view of
mergers: “Study after study of past merger waves
has shown that two of every three deals have not
worked; the only winners are the shareholders of
the acquired firm, who sell their company for
more than it is really worth.”2  By and large, the
merger literature concludes that consolidation
generally does not lead to significant performance
gains or overall shareholder wealth creation. One
notable study reached a different conclusion.
Cornett and Tehranian not only found merger-
related gains (on average) among their sample of
30 mergers involving publicly traded banking
institutions, but also concluded that weighted ab-
normal returns around the merger announcement
are positive.3
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
financial reality of mergers in the lodging indus-
try and to determine whether the financial mar-
ket views consolidation as value enhancing in the
lodging industry. The results are useful for those
managers considering acquisitions as against
other forms of growth. The approach taken in-
volves evaluating the stock market’s reaction to
merger announcements. This analysis is per-
formed for both acquirers and targets and for
mergers and tender offers separately.4
2 “How to Make Mergers Work, ”The Economist, January
9, 1999, pp. 21–23.
3 Cornett and Tehranian, “Changes in Corporate Perfor-
mance Associated with Bank Acquisitions,” Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 31 (April 1992), pp. 211–234.
4 A tender offer is a publicly announced offer to buy shares
at a fixed price from anyone who “tenders” their shares.
Public and private lodging-industry
acquisitions, 1982–2000
Year Number Aggregate value
1982 1 $152.4
1983 2 423.7
1984 2 316.0
1985 3 460.3
1986 2 1,065.0
1987 0 0
1988 4 50.7
1989 1 55.5
1990 1 48.4
1991 0 0
1992 1 4.8
1993 2 29.7
1994 5 280.1
1995 5 196.4
1996 4 4,936.0
1997 7 15,559.6
1998 11 25,013.1
1999 5 4,827.0
2000 1 428.3
Total 57 $53,847.0
  Note: Value figures are in millions of U.S. nominal dollars.
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While many studies use this equity-based ap-
proach to examine the abnormal returns of both
acquirers and targets for the overall capital mar-
ket, only one has analyzed the abnormal returns
in the lodging industry. Kwansa analyzed the
stock-price reaction to merger announcements
for a sample of target firms in the lodging sector
between 1980 and 1990.5  My study adds to this
area of research by extending the sample
data through 1999, by including the portfolio of
acquiring firms in addition to the target firms,
and by analyzing mergers and tender offers sepa-
rately. I analyzed mergers and tender offers sepa-
rately for two reasons. First, the theoretical mod-
els imply possible differences in the results.
Second, the price behavior of bidders in mergers
and tender offers remains a controversial issue in
finance.6
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. First, it reviews the existing empirical
evidence. Second, it describes the data sample
and presents the methodology. Third, it reports
the results of my statistical tests.
Empirical Evidence
Many researchers have addressed the question of
anticipated wealth gains from acquisitions for the
overall capital market. The evidence indicates that
the stockholders of target firms are clear winners
in takeovers, because they earn excess returns
around the announcement of the acquisitions.
Jensen and Ruback, for instance, reviewed 13
studies that look at abnormal returns around
merger announcements and reported an average
excess return of 30 percent to target stockhold-
ers in successful tender offers and 20 percent to
target stockholders in successful mergers.7  After
reviewing the results of 663 tender offers made
between 1962 and 1985, Jarrell, Brickley, and
Methodology
The following is a brief description of the standard event-study methodology that I
used to compute the excess returns and t-statistics for the portfolio of acquiring and
target firms during the announcement period. Daily closing prices of the stock for
each company were obtained from the CRSP Daily File. The sample period, for each
company, is defined as 111 days before the announcement date through one day after
the announcement date. The daily returns were computed as the log price relatives
adjusted for dividends.—L.C.
First, the expected return was computed during the estimation period by event i, by
company j
where:
t      is the t’th day relative to a given announcement date i for firm j,
Rjit  is the log price relative for firm j, event i, day t, and
Nji  is the number of trading days in the estimation period for event i, company j.
The unexpected or excess return is calculated for each day, t, in the event period, by
event i, by company j. Excess return is defined as the actual daily return minus the ex-
pected return, calculated thus:
where t denotes the t’th day relative to a given announcement date i for firm j. The
excess returns are averaged across events for the acquiring and target companies sepa-
rately to compute the unexpected return for the acquiring–target portfolio of firms for
each day, t, in the event period, as follows:*
where Ij represents the number of announcements of mergers for company j.
To test the statistical significance of the daily excess returns by event and the daily ex-
cess returns for the acquiring and target portfolios, t statistics were calculated, in the
following manner: (1) Calculate the t-statistic for the unexpected return, by event day,
t, by announcement, i, by company, j:
where seji is the standard error of the unexpected returns calculated over the 100-day
estimation period prior to the event period of each announcement i, by company, j.
(2) Calculate the t-statistic for the unexpected return on each portfolio, by event day, t:
5 F.A. Kwansa, “Acquisitions, Shareholder Wealth and the
Lodging Sector: 1980–1990,” International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality Management, Vol. 6 (1994),
pp. 16–20.
6 For a discussion of the theoretical models, see: M. Brad-
ley, “Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate
Control,” Journal of Business, Vol.53, No. 4, October 1980,
pp. 345–376.
7 M.C. Jensen and R.S. Ruback, “The Market for Corpo-
rate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 11, April 1983, pp. 5–50.
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abnormal returns around the announcement of
takeovers. Thus, shareholders may be skeptical
about the perceived value of the takeover in many
cases.10
Cornett and Tehranian examined the abnor-
mal returns for 15 large interstate and 15 large
intrastate bank acquisitions completed between
1982 and 1987 on the day before an acquisition
was announced and the day of the actual an-
nouncement.11  They found the weighted aver-
age of the abnormal returns of the acquirer and
the target to be 2.09 percent (significant at the
0.05 level). This result is consistent with the find-
ing in other bank-merger studies.12
Kwansa’s analysis of the stock-price reaction
to merger announcements comprised a sample
of 18 target lodging firms during the first great
wave of acquisitions in the 1980s. The results
showed significantly positive cumulative excess
returns of 31.5 percent during the period of 30
days before to 30 days after the announcement
day.13
The Sample and Methodology
My data sample was formed by a two-stage pro-
cess. First, I searched the Center for Research on
10 See: Ibid.; P. Dodd and R. Ruback, “Tender Offers and
Stockholder Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.
5 (1977), pp. 351–373; D. Kummer and R. Hoffmeister,
“Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers,” Journal
of Finance, Vol. 33, May 1978, pp. 505–516; P. Dodd,
“Merger Proposals, Management Discretion, and Stock-
holder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8, June
1980, pp. 105–138; P. Asquith, “Merger Bids, Uncertainty,
and Stockholder Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 11, April 1983, pp. 51–84; M. Bradley, A. Desai, and
E.H. Kim, “The Rationale behind Interfirm Tender Of-
fers: Information or Synergy?,” Journal of Financial Econom-
ics, Vol. 11, April 1983, pp. 183–206; and P.H. Malatesta,
“The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective
Functions of Merging Firms,” Journal of Financial Econom-
ics, Vol. 11, April 1983, pp. 155–181.
11 Cornett and Tehranian, pp. 211–234.
12 See: M.M. Cornett and S. De, “Common Stock Returns
in Corporate Takeover Bids: Evidence from Interstate Bank
Mergers,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 15, No. 2
(April 1991), pp. 273–295; F. de Cassio, J.W. Trifts, and
K.P. Scanlon, “Bank Equity Returns: The Difference be-
tween Intrastate and Interstate Bank Mergers,” working
paper, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 1988;
and J.W. Trifts and K.P. Scanlon, “Interstate Bank Mergers:
The Early Evidence,” Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 10,
December 1987, pp. 305–311.
13 Significant at p <  0.01 level; see Kwansa, op. cit.
EXHIBIT 2
Public lodging-industry acquisitions, 1982–2000
Year Number Aggregate value
1982 1 $152.4
1983 1 137.4
1984 2 316.0
1985 3 460.3
1986 2 1,065.0
1987 0 0
1988 2 39.1
1989 1 55.5
1990 0 0
1991 0 0
1992 1 4.8
1993 0 0
1994 2 80.2
1995 4 193.9
1996 3 4,934.5
1997 7 15,559.6
1998 10 25,011.7
1999 2 1,090.3
Total 41 49,100.7
   Note: Value figures are in millions of U.S. nominal dollars.
Netter noted that the premiums thus attained
ranged from 19 percent to 35 percent.8
The effect of takeover announcements on the
bidding firm’s stock prices is not as clear cut.
Jensen and Ruback reported abnormal returns
of 4 percent for bidding-firm stockholders around
tender offers and no abnormal returns around
mergers.9  Other studies indicate that approxi-
mately half of all bidding firms earn negative
8 Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, and Jeffry Netter “The
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence
since 1980,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 1
(1988), pp. 49–68.
9 Jensen and Ruback , pp. 5–50.
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Securities’ Prices (CRSP)  data files for all NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ firms delisted during
1981–1998.14  Second, I searched the Securities
Data Company (SDC)  database for all mergers
from January 1999 through March 2000. CRSP
identifies firms delisted by reason of acquisition
with specific codes for delisting and for the last
dividend payment. The delisting date is the ef-
fective date of acquisition. I checked the Capital
Adjustments Register to identify the acquiring firm
for each delisted firm and collected the announce-
ment dates from the Wall Street Journal Index.
The final sample comprises acquisitions that sat-
isfy the following criteria: the acquirer and the
target are U.S. companies listed on NYSE, ASE,
or NASDAQ; both are included in the CRSP
data base; no other significant events were an-
nounced or occurred 111 days before through
one day after the announcement date; and the
acquirer or the target firm is in the lodging in-
dustry.15  As summarized in Exhibit 2, the num-
ber and value of lodging acquisitions peaked in
1999 with an acquisition value over $25 billion.
I obtained daily closing prices of the stock for
each company involved in a merger from the
CRSP Daily File. The sample period, for each
company, is defined as 111 days before the an-
nouncement date through one day after the an-
nouncement date. The daily returns were com-
puted as the log (logarithm) price relatives
adjusted for dividends, that is, the natural log of
the ratio of stock prices plus dividends at time t
divided by the stock price at time t-1 (i.e., the
day before). This is mathematically equivalent
to computing the total daily return at time t as
the stock price at time t plus the dividend at time
t minus the stock price at time t-1, all divided by
the stock price at time t-1.
The analysis of the effect of corporate acqui-
sitions on stockholder returns is accomplished
by testing the statistical significance of the unex-
pected return of a portfolio of acquiring and tar-
get firms that announced mergers in the lodging
industry using the event-study methodology.16  I
computed the unexpected returns for the port-
folios of acquiring and target firms for each day
of the event period, using the mean model to
estimate the expected return during the estima-
tion period. The event period extends from two
days before the announcement date through one
day after that date. The estimation period con-
sists of 100 trading days ending 10 days prior to
the event period.
To test whether the financial markets view
merger announcements as good news, I exam-
ined the unexpected return from two days be-
fore through the day after the merger announce-
ment.17  The unexpected (i.e., abnormal) return
is defined as the actual return minus the return
expected by the market before the merger an-
nouncement. As such, the unexpected return rep-
resents the additional value associated with the
merger announcement. If the unexpected return
is positive and statistically significant, the impli-
cation is that the financial markets view the
merger announcement as good news (presum-
ably because the merger enhances the value of
the firm). On the other hand, if the unexpected
return is negative and statistically significant, one
14 NYSE = New York Stock Exchange, ASE = American
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ = National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System. In gen-
eral, a firm that has been merged or acquired is no longer
traded on an exchange. Another common reason for
delisting is that a firm’s stock price has fallen below a set
minimum.
15 The lodging industry was defined by the 4-digit SIC code
of  7011; the Lodging Real Estate Investment Trusts, by SIC
codes of 6798 and 6799.
16 A brief description of the methodology is presented in
the sidebar on page 49. For a detailed explanation, see:
S. Brown and J. Warner, “Measuring Security-price Perfor-
mance,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8, Sept. 1980,
pp. 205–258; and S. Brown and J. Warner, “Using Daily
Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies,” Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol.14, March 1985, pp. 3–31.
17 Kwansa found that the unexpected returns for the targets
were insignificantly different from zero on days –30 through
–2 and beyond day +1.
The number and value of lodging acquisi-
tions peaked in 1999 with an acquisition
value over $25 billion.
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could conclude that the stock market views the
announcement as bad news that will result in a
reduction of the combined firm’s overall value.
Last, if the unexpected return is insignificantly
different from zero, then the merger announce-
ment has no impact on the firm’s value.
Happy Returns
The results, the excess return, and the t-statistic
for the portfolio of acquiring firms and target
firms for each day in the event period are pre-
sented in Exhibit 3. The first section presents the
results for the entire sample of both mergers and
tender offers. The second section shows the re-
sults for the sample of mergers alone, while the
third panel exhibits the results for the sample of
tender offers alone.
Merged and tendered. As shown in Part 1 of
Exhibit 3, the unexpected return for the entire
portfolio of target firms (whether by merger or
tender offer) is significantly different from zero
on the announcement day (i.e., day 0) and the
following day (day 1).18  On the announcement
day the unexpected return is 8.9089 percent,
while the unexpected return is 1.3406 percent
for the following day.19  Each is significant at the
1-percent level of significance. The extremely
large abnormal returns make it quite clear that
the shareholders of the target firm benefit upon
the announcement of the merger.
For the acquiring firms, on the other hand,
the unexpected return is much lower than for
the targets and is significantly different from zero
only on the announcement day itself. The unex-
pected return on the announcement day is 1.2820
percent for the acquiring firms (much less than
the 8.9 percent for the target firms). The unex-
pected return for the portfolio of acquirers is in-
significantly different from zero for both the days
preceding and following the announcement.
Even though the gains are uneven, the results
show that the shareholders of both the acquiring
and target firms gain at the time of the merger
announcement. The much-greater gains for the
shareholders of the target firms are consistent
with the empirical evidence found in the bank-
ing industry.
These results imply that the announcement
of an acquisition reflects positive information
about the firms involved, which in turn fosters a
favorable stock-price response based on the ex-
pectations of a positive unexpected return. That
positive price response may be due to stockhold-
ers’ expectations regarding the effects of monopo-
listic market power, increased productive effi-
ciency due to synergies, or increased efficiency
due to the removal of inefficiencies. Each of these
effects predicts that the combined firm will gen-
erate cash flows with a present value in excess of
EXHIBIT 3
Abnormal returns for acquiring and target
lodging-industry firms
Part 1:  All lodging-industry acquisitions (mergers and tender offers)
Acquirer Target
Abnormal-return Abnormal-return
 Day* percentage t-statistic percentage t-statistic
-1 0.0547 0.1826 0.6599 0.3358
0 1.2820 3.1460 8.9089 26.4655
+1 -0.2328 -1.4283 1.3406 2.2975
Part 2:  Mergers only
Acquirer Target
Abnormal-return Abnormal-return
 Day* percentage t-statistic percentage t-statistic
-1 -0.2325 0.1725 1.8153 1.9150
0 0.9056 2.5559 5.5806 17.8217
+1 -0.3254 -1.5722 0.7201 1.8376
Part 3:  Tender offers only
Acquirer Target
Abnormal-return Abnormal-return
 Day* percentage t-statistic percentage t-statistic
-1 0.4950 0.1813 -3.2850 -2.2885
0 3.6140 3.5108 14.1200 25.1292
+1 -0.1420 -0.5471 3.7050 1.0758
*relative to announcement day.
18 The abnormal returns computed for days  –11 through
–3 were insignificantly different from zero.
19 The abnormal returns were insignificantly different from
zero beyond day 1.
 at CORNELL UNIV on May 4, 2015cqx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS                    FINANCE
DECEMBER 2001 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly   53
the sum of the market values of the acquiring
and target firms.
The results found here are similar to those
found generally for target firms but are different
from the usual outcome for acquiring firms. Most
studies that examine mergers’ effect on sharehold-
ers agree that target-firm shareholders gain when
the merger is announced, and this study’s results
are consistent with that observation. The exist-
ing evidence regarding the gains to acquiring
shareholders is mixed, though. Some studies show
that merger bids are, on balance, negative net-
present-value investments for bidders. However,
others report slightly positive, but statistically
insignificant, abnormal returns—suggesting that
merger bids are at best zero net-present-value
investments.
My findings differ from both of those out-
comes, since I found significantly positive unex-
pected returns for the portfolio of bidding firms
on the merger-announcement day. In contrast
to the results of most acquisitions, I found that
the stockholders of both the acquiring firm and
the target firm gained at the time of the merger
announcement. It appears that in the lodging in-
dustry, then, mergers are positive net-present-
value investments for bidders. As a result, one
can conclude that, on average, lodging-industry
mergers have been value-maximizing tactics.
In sum, the results suggest that mergers ap-
pear to be value enhancing in the lodging indus-
try since both the target and acquiring portfolios
earn positive excess returns. On balance, lodging
firms’ mergers have increased the value to the
shareholders of the target firms, while at the same
time most likely increasing the value of share-
holders’ stake in the acquiring firms.
The difference. The lodging industry’s results
may differ from those of the overall market be-
cause most of the mergers in the lodging indus-
try involve companies with the same core busi-
ness. It makes sense that mergers are more likely
to succeed when companies buy businesses with
which they are familiar. It is also true that the
largest number of lodging-industry mergers have
occurred in recent years. At the same time, se-
nior managers have become substantial share-
holders, ensuring that their interests are more
closely aligned with those of other owners of the
business. This may have discouraged deals that
are based more on egotism or wishful thinking
than on hard analysis.
How Mergers Differ from Tender
Offers
The empirical evidence for the overall market
indicates that the value-creation effect of take-
over attempts varies across takeover techniques.
Outright acquisition via tender offer has gener-
ally resulted in higher abnormal returns than have
mergers. The mode of acquisition may be related
to the expected wealth gains resulting from en-
hanced operating efficiencies and more focused
management. Mergers are usually friendly deals
that enjoy the cooperation of incumbent man-
agers. Tender offers are made directly to target
shareholders, often to overcome resistance from
incumbent managers. Moreover, tender offers
indicate confidence in the acquirer’s ability to
realize efficiency gains from the acquisition. Mar-
tin and McConnell, for instance, document a
large turnover of target managers during the two
years following tender offers, which suggests that
the acquirers in tender offers attempt to create
wealth by removing inefficient and redundant
managers.20
Parts 2 and 3 of Exhibit 3 show results consis-
tent with those of other researchers. Target firms
experience statistically significant differences in
abnormal stock-price changes on the announce-
ment day—14.12 percent for tender offers and
5.5806 percent for mergers. Acquiring firms ex-
perience statistically significant abnormal returns
of 3.6 percent in tender offers but only 0.9 per-
Even though the gains are uneven, the
results show that the shareholders of both
the acquiring and target firms gain at the
time of the merger announcement.
20 K. Martin and J. McConnell, “Corporate Performance,
Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover,” The Jour-
nal of Finance, Vol. 51, June 1991, pp. 1227–1246.
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cent in mergers. Thus, the wealth gains ensuing
from lodging-industry tender offers are signifi-
cantly greater than those of mergers. The reasons
for this difference would make an interesting
topic for further research.
Valuable Decisions
This study has shown that the stock market re-
acts favorably to merger announcements in the
lodging industry for both acquiring and target
firms. In addition, the reaction is significantly
more favorable for tender offers than for merg-
ers. This implies that acquisitions have been valu-
able decisions from the capital market’s perspec-
tive. These results differ from those for the overall
market in which shareholders of the target earn
more positive returns than do those of the
acquiring firm (in a tender offer), while stock-
holders in a merged firm generally see negative
returns.21
My study is quantitative only and provides no
real indication of why the hospitality industry’s
outcomes vary with those of capital markets gen-
erally. I speculatively offer three explanations.
First, because hotel firms are merging with each
other, the costs and difficulty associated with the
merger implementation may be lower than those
in other industries. Second, improvements in the
quality of management and the elimination of
redundant facilities and personnel may be easier
to achieve in the lodging industry than in other
types of firms. Finally, increased market power
may raise performance, either as a result of econo-
mies of scale or of scope, if the business can cap-
ture more revenue by offering a broader range of
services to its customer base than previously.
Moreover, cost reductions may be achieved
through economies of scale (e.g., due to comple-
mentary resources or elimination of inefficiency)
obtained after reaching a critical mass. These
speculations can be resolved through an exami-
nation of whether operating cash flows have in-
creased following a merger or acquisition. Such
revenue growth would explain favorable stock-
price reactions at the time a merger is announced.
This is the topic of my current research.  
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